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Introduction (1)
Global energy security is put at risk by the uneasy relationship be-tween the international political system and the international en-ergy system. The political framework of the International Energy
Agency (IEA) was created to manage energy security in the developed world
and in relations with producing countries in OPEC. Both recognise a need
for a more comprehensive producer-consumer dialogue. However, the ever-
expanding energy demand of the developing world, the “globalisation of
energy demand,” and the emergence of non-OPEC producing countries that
now account for 60% of world oil production fall outside of that framework.
China, the world's largest net oil importer, remains outside the IEA, as does
India. Their resistance to the norms of global energy governance makes
them reluctant to participate in these international institutions, producing
gaps in global energy governance. It is in the ungoverned space of world oil
production and consumption that China implements its resource diplomacy
and promotes alternative institutions. 
Beijing began its association with the IEA in 1996 as a non-member econ-
omy, holding workshops and seminars. There is a special IEA office for rela-
tions with China. For China, membership in the IEA would be difficult due
to the requirement of holding a 90-day strategic petroleum reserve (SPR).
As a non-member, China is reluctant to disclose petroleum data to the IEA,
which Chinese feel only serves the interests of OECD members rather than
the good of the international community.
The strongest platforms for Chinese participation in global energy gover-
nance are situated in OECD countries, such as the IEA, the Energy Charter,
and numerous energy research institutions. These OECD resources can best
help reform Chinese domestic energy governance. However, China’s further
integration into the current energy governance system would require fur-
ther domestic energy policy reform.
Alternatively, China could restructure the global energy governance system
in such a way as to put less pressure for reform on its domestic energy econ-
omy. Chinese energy diplomacy has thus concentrated on constructing an
alternative energy governance structure in the BRICS organisation, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and in Central Asia through the
Silk Road initiative. 
The construction of international energy institutions is generally under-
stood within the liberal institutionalist approach. This theoretical approach
is useful for the topic of Chinese domestic and international energy politics
because it does not draw a hard line between domestic and international
politics. (2) The approach is also useful as it treats international institutions
as a solution for overcoming dysfunctionalities, the “dark underbelly” of cor-
ruption in the world oil economy. The liberal institutionalist approach has
embedded in it the promotion of certain liberal values – corporate social
responsibility, transparency, regulation of illicit trade, good governance, eco-
nomic liberalisation – that are meant to create global and regional order. (3)
These are values that the IEA promotes but would not necessarily be pro-
moted by the BRICS. BRICS domestic energy governance in China, Russia,
and Brazil is plagued by corruption, and does not conform to best practices.
Central Asia’s energy-producing countries have similar problems.
China and the other BRICS nations have not elaborated on a theory ap-
propriate for their alternative international energy institutions. Chinese
scholars recognise China’s theory deficit in global governance. (4) Chinese
have said they want new rules and institutions for global energy governance
but have not defined them.
Russian scholar Dmitri Trenin, addressing a Chinese audience, warns BRICS
that seeking a new world order will not be realised by overthrowing the ex-
isting US-led world order but rather by a triumph of “global best practices”
as viable alternatives to current business practices. But they can do this only
if their global institution-building goes beyond anti-Western declarations. (5)
Beijing and Moscow pose a challenge to the West’s liberal world order. As
their identities evolve in alienation from Western values, their domestic au-
thoritarianism drives them to restructure their external environment. (6)
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Russia, with aspirations to lead the BRICS, should have been a source of
concrete initiatives but has hedged instead. Vladimir Putin's speech at the
UN General Assembly in September 2015 was critical of the current world
order but lacked concrete proposals for an alternative world order. In De-
cember 2015, a Russian documentary, World Order, was very critical of the
US-led world order but portrayed Putin as continuing to rely on its institu-
tions, such as the UN Charter. (7)
In July 2015, Putin enthusiastically hosted the BRICS Summit and SCO
Summit jointly to demonstrate that Russia was not isolated by Western
sanctions but rather was an emerging leader, in conjunction with China, of
an alternative world order. The BRICS share with the SCO an alienation with
Western-led global institutions, and the Sino-Russian partnership is impor-
tant to both groups. (8)
China has also hedged. Feiling Wang has noted that Beijing wants the ben-
efits of both the Westphalian system and the Sino-centric order. This leads
to a profound disjointedness in Chinese foreign policy, ranging from inte-
grating into the Westphalian system to displacing it with a Chinese world
order. (9)
American sceptics believe China, as the rising hegemon, is promoting a
de-legitimation of the US-led world order and is attempting to construct
an alternative world order. They argue that China simultaneously pursues
the role of spoiler, supporter, and shirker of the current world order. (10)
China has framed the question of regional order as based on geography
with China at its centre in a Sino-centric order. The Silk Road Economic Belt
(SREB) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (One Belt One Road, or
OBOR) are geographically based with China at the centre. 
Geography does not support Chinese leadership of the BRICS, however.
Therefore, a non-geographic, abstract concept, “the power shift,” is used in
a Chinese narrative that claims the power shift is drawing China into a
greater role in global governance based on growing GDP, expanding exports,
and military capability. According to the narrative, a sustainable global order
is only possible with China participating in global governance. (11)
A study on Chinese and Indian perspectives of global order found areas of
convergence and divergence but not an emerging BRICS perspective that
would indicate consensus on what kind of global order the BRICS might
want. (12)
BRICS Summits have supported access to affordable clean energy, the
need to strengthen producer-consumer dialogues, and greater cooperation
in energy efficiency, R&D, and technology transfer. BRICS energy policy does
not diverge from Western international energy institutions in any of these
areas, which may be one reason why there is not yet any BRICS alternative
international energy institution.
A few years ago, John Ikenberry warned that the trend of constructing
geopolitical blocs would fragment the US-led liberal world order and break
down its institutions. (13) Ikenberry later reconsidered his position, arguing
that the global order is not that fragile, and that both Russia and China are
deeply integrated into current governing institutions. (14)
This paper will examine Chinese efforts to construct an alternative energy
governance structure in the BRICS organisation. For various reasons, these
efforts evolved into an effort to create an autonomous energy system with
Central Asia and the Middle East under the framework of the “Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt,” a program of the Xi Jinping government. This paper examines
Chinese discontent with the existing global energy governance system, part
of a wider discontent with Western-led global governance that was a prel-
ude to proposing the “Silk Road Economic Belt.”
China within Western global energy
governance
Global energy governance requires rules and institutions that form an in-
stitutional architecture undergirding world oil and gas markets. Existing in-
stitutions are being challenged by China and India’s rapidly increasing oil
and gas demand. (15) China’s past under-participation and limited capacity
in Western international institutions – ideationally and financially – has
long been noted. (16)
Global energy governance has few strong international institutions. Both
the IEA and OPEC are under-institutionalised, with only partial membership
from oil importing and exporting countries. (17) This leaves the global energy
governance system vulnerable to challenges. Both IEA and OPEC recognise
the need for a more comprehensive producer-consumer dialogue. 
Global energy governance is defined as “Making and enforcing rules to
avoid the collective action problems related to energy at a scale beyond
the nation-state.” The current global energy governance structure has many
gaps. The rules and institutions of global energy governance have emerged
ad hoc rather than as the result of coherent strategies.
Global energy governance as constructed by the developed countries has
been criticised as inadequate to meet numerous challenges: unreliable sup-
ply of energy fuels, massive environmental degradation, and failure to pro-
vide modern energy resources to a large part of the global population. (18)
Analysts identify six types of global energy governors: intergovernmental
organisations such as UNDP and IEA, summit processes such as BRICS, in-
ternational nongovernmental organisations such the World Resources In-
stitute, multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank, and
regional organisations such as APEC. The World Bank and the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, with technical expertise and finances, have significant influ-
ence on Asia’s energy technology, regulation, and policy through their
investment in energy infrastructure. They are expected to take a leadership
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role in low-carbon development but are criticised for relying too heavily on
market mechanisms, not integrating environmental and social considera-
tions into their financing of energy projects, putting priority on developed
countries’ interests, and failing to give developing countries more voice. (19)
Western global energy governance has focused on the Energy Charter and
encourages emerging economies to join it. The Energy Charter of 1994 is a
multilateral treaty with legally binding provisions for the promotion and
protection of energy investments, transport, trade, and the reduction of risk.
Membership includes producing, consuming and transit countries. (20) Chi-
nese energy reformers are responsive to these initiatives. In 2015, during a
visit to Beijing by Ambassador Rusnak, Secretary General of the Energy
Charter, China’s Energy Research Institute held an “Energy Charter and
Global Energy Governance Workshop” attended by the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission, the National Energy Administration, the In-
ternational Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and many other
government agencies. 
China became an observer country to the Energy Charter in 2011. China
is a participant in the Task Force for Regional Energy Cooperation in Central
Asia, and participates in negotiations for a World Energy Charter launched
in 2014. The Energy Charter has given China a platform within the current
global energy governance system.
The Chinese Energy Research Institute, under the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the Grantham Institute for Climate
Change, Imperial College in London, created a joint project for enhancing
China’s participation in the current global energy governance system while
also considering potential reform of the system. The resulting report made
recommendations for jointly building a new international energy order: pro-
mote G20 leadership of the system, and integrate developing countries and
the BRICS into the organisations of global energy governance. 
Recommendations for China: strengthen China’s modern governance ca-
pacity in the energy sector and modernise energy management capacity
related to global energy governance; strengthen China’s ability to use in-
ternational energy rules and shape international energy issues; strengthen
capacity for using energy diplomacy; greater awareness of the international
dimension of energy policies related to international energy markets; im-
proved ability to explain energy policies internationally; establishment of
consultation mechanisms for international energy cooperation and energy
diplomacy. (21)
All of the report’s recommendations placed enormous demands for do-
mestic reform and modernisation on China’s energy producers, consumers,
and institutions. It was assumed that with this domestic transformation,
China would engage more positively in Western global energy gover-
nance. (22)
China’s domestic energy governance
capacity
There are ungoverned spaces in China’s domestic energy production and
consumption, a lack of energy governance that makes China vulnerable to
the world oil market, increases its sense of insecurity, and leads to perpetual
debates on China’s energy security. Uncontrolled domestic oil demand lead-
ing to a rapid increase in oil imports, crude oil and petroleum product smug-
gling, and independent “teapot” refineries are some of the activities in the
ungoverned space. China’s national oil companies (NOCs) – CNPC,
Petrochina, Sinopec, CNOOC – investing in overseas oil fields, appeared to
operate in ungoverned space globally, beyond the reach of the state, until
the anti-corruption campaign decimated their leadership beginning in 2013.
Debates over China’s dependence on oil imports have continued for two
decades. In these debates inadequate governance of the domestic energy
sector is identified as the biggest threat to China’s energy security. (23) Chi-
nese analysts identify numerous causes of energy ungovernability: the cen-
tral government is fragmented, provincial actors diverge from the centre,
and the NOCs differ from both the centre and the localities on domestic
energy governance. It is the impact of globalisation during the economic
reforms that has led to a decay in China’s capacity for domestic energy gov-
ernance. (24)
Lack of transparency in China’s energy policymaking and energy data is a
problem for both domestic governance and global energy governance. It is
in fact considered a state secret how Beijing makes energy policy. As China
became the world’s largest oil importer in 2015, its domestic ungoverned
spaces became a problem for world oil markets.
Since the beginning of the economic reforms, Beijing has reorganised the
energy bureaucracy multiple times. Each time has been an effort to more
rationally manage energy demand and supply. A Ministry of Energy was cre-
ated in 1988, but it was quickly disbanded due to pressure from energy in-
dustry interests. For three decades energy reformers have tried to shift
investment into energy efficiency and conservation but have been coun-
tered by powerful opponents – the coal industry and the NOCs. China’s ef-
forts to control domestic energy demand have increasingly had to consider
the linkage between domestic and international policies due to its regional
environmental impact.
In 2003, Chinese oil demand rapidly escalated, as did oil imports, leading
to an “energy crisis” followed by a “Malacca Strait dilemma,” increasing vul-
nerability to interruption of oil supply by blocking China’s access to the sea.
Energy reformers in the NDRC’s Energy Research Institute (ERI) and the
State Council’s Development Research Centre produced a joint study out-
lining an energy strategy for China. The strategy would have China control-
ling domestic demand by joining international energy institutions in order
to implement energy efficiency policies. The final draft was issued in June
2004. (25)
A 2005 reorganisation of the energy bureaucracy created a National Energy
Leading Group (NELG) whose responsibility it was to provide guidance in
national energy planning and to promote international cooperation. A Na-
tional Energy Office was established to implement NELG policies and coor-
dinate NDRC energy functions. (26) Reorganisation of the Chinese energy
bureaucracy was helpful for participation in multilateral energy cooperation.
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The energy bureaucracy was reorganised again in 2008. The Energy Bureau
was transformed into the National Energy Administration (NEA), taking on
the functions of the Bureau, the Department for Energy Efficiency, and the
Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence
(COSTIND). The NEA was given responsibility for international energy co-
operation, approval of foreign energy investments, management of strategic
petroleum reserves, and oversight of energy industries, including the Chinese
NOCs. The National Energy Leading Group was reorganised into the Na-
tional Energy Commission with responsibility for coordinating energy pol-
icy. (27) There was scepticism over this new re-organisation, with no
expectation that these new organisations would have greater authority over
the Chinese NOCs than previous agencies. (28) The NOCs had always drawn
resources away from investment in energy efficiency in favour of investing
in increasing supply. In 2012 China NOCs invested $25 billion in overseas
energy assets. This was 39% more than in 2011.
On 10 March 2013, Beijing announced that the State Council was once
again being reorganised, the seventh time since the economic reforms
began. Energy bureaucracies were also redesigned to improve their domestic
efficiency. The State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) was folded
into the National Energy Administration. Prior to reorganisation, the NEA
and SERC had overlapping functions and responsibilities in the electricity
sector. The NEA’s responsibilities included drafting and implementing energy
development strategies, plans, and policies, and strengthening implemen-
tation of energy efficiency policies. On 20 March, SERC denied that it was
being dissolved. On 25 March, the former head of SERC was appointed head
of the NEA.
The NEA needed to address problems that persisted over the past three
decades: the need to change the energy mix, reduce coal consumption (coal
is generally used for power generation), increase renewable energy use, re-
duce oil imports, which were approaching 60% of domestic oil consump-
tion, and change China into a low-carbon society.
Chinese global energy governance
People’s Daily declared in July 2011 that China’s participation in global
energy governance and climate change negotiations was an important
strategic goal for China’s energy diplomacy. The editorial argued that par-
ticipation in global governance would help China realise good domestic en-
ergy governance and also increase Chinese influence in the world. The
newspaper claimed that China’s current status in global governance was
not in keeping with its status as the world’s largest oil importer. China
needed to create a new framework for global energy governance, one that
gave China a larger role and greater status. (29)
The implications of this statement were: China has not managed domestic
energy governance very well, which has resulted in China becoming the
world’s largest oil importer. This domestic governance failure is given as the
reason China is qualified to rewrite the rules and re-organise the institutions
of global energy governance. The ultimate Chinese purpose is to give China
greater status in global energy issues.
At the World Future Energy Summit in Abu Dhabi in 2012, Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao proposed the creation of rules governing global energy supply
overseen by an international body to govern energy markets for greater sta-
bility. Wen called for creation of a G20-type organisation to administer “fair,
reasonable, and binding” global rules that would stabilise oil and natural
gas markets. (30)
Some Chinese analysts warned that China is too fragmented to have a
unified voice on global energy governance. Consequently, China lacked the
capacity to upset or challenge the global energy order, and was uncertain
as to its role in global energy governance. (31) Other analysts, such as 
Xu Xiaojie, argued that in the realm of global oil markets, China has not
been passive. China has been called the “Black Energy Swan,” which means
China is a steady source of surprise – black swan events – in the world oil
economy due to its insatiable rising domestic oil demand and its unpre-
dictable international behaviour. 
Xu Xiaojie noted that relations with the US have been strained because
this Black Energy Swan has “incompatible cultures, conflicts of interest, and
lack of shared rules” with the US. China has the potential to become a White
Energy Swan, which would mean that Chinese energy behaviour would be
more transparent, responsible, comprehensible, and predictable, and would
follow international rules and practices. A new world order would need to
be created with new rules before China could become a White Energy Swan.
A new concept of energy security was needed, one that included security
of oil demand with security of oil supply. The international institutions best
suited for China’s transformation into a White Swan were the Shanghai Co-
operation Organisation, the G20, and the BRICS, where China has a role to
play and influence over the rules. (32)
Russia in many ways has also constituted a “Black Energy Swan,” its energy
policy choices impacting global energy security. The IEA's World Energy Out-
look 2011 included an in-depth study of Russia’s energy sector. Russia has
an uncertain investment climate and tax regime, poor energy efficiency,
and declining production. (33) The critique of Russian policymakers is that
they are overly concerned with collecting the rent of oil wealth and short
payback time, and insufficiently concerned with long-term investment in
oil production and infrastructure. (34) With declining production, Russia needs
to focus on developing new fields. In June 2011, the IEA reportedly pleaded
with Russia (and OPEC) to join with the IEA in brokering an agreement be-
tween producers and consumers that would solve what was then a crisis of
high oil prices. The IEA urged OPEC to increase production. Producing coun-
tries, Russia and OPEC, blamed high prices on the financialisation of the oil
market. (35)
Some Chinese felt international organisations such as the IEA excessively
criticised Chinese energy consumption practices as China became the
largest emitter of greenhouse gases. The IEA pushed Beijing to reduce carbon
emissions and take more responsibility, what Chinese called the “theory of
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China’s energy responsibility” (Zhongguo nengyuan zeren lun 中国能源责
任论). (36) Chinese reject the notion that China has any responsibility to the
world regarding its energy consumption.
In the dimension of global energy governance, the question is: can the
Chinese Black Energy Swan expand its role in global energy governance, re-
vise the rules and institutions of that governance to suit its own preferences,
in ways that the international community would find acceptable? Can China
use this global energy governance to reform domestic energy governance,
or will Chinese domestic governance practices, very weak on rules and in-
stitutionalisation, undermine global energy governance and governability?
Beijing feels restricted by current international institutions created by the
West. The IEA and China have had running disagreements regarding China’s
impact on world oil demand. The IEA has criticised Beijing for China’s con-
tinually expanding oil demand, warning in 2007 that “In the next five years,
almost half of global oil demand growth will come from China, and this
trend is set to continue to 2035, as oil demand from the transportation sec-
tor is growing strongly in countries such as China and India.” (37) The IEA fo-
cused on Chinese and Indian energy demand in World Energy Outlook 2007:
China and India Insights. (38)
For the past two decades, China has been promoting the idea that there
is a need for a new international political and economic order that would
counter the global order shaped by the West and especially the US. It was
strong on rhetoric but failed to gain an international following. The 2008
global financial crisis created opportunities to more intensely challenge the
existing order. The emergence of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa) created an additional opportunity of multi-polarity, something
Beijing has hoped for since the end of the Cold War, which would counter
US hegemony and the US unipolar moment. (39)
There is a Chinese narrative emerging on why greater Chinese participa-
tion is needed in global governance because there is a global governance
deficit, a gap between world demand for global governance and the inability
of existing international institutions to meet that demand. The emerging
powers, BRICS, and especially China should be given larger roles in these in-
stitutions alongside the US and Europe to create a more sustainable world
order. (40) In contrast, Western analysts contend that China is only a partial
power with a constrained global governance capacity. (41)
As China makes the case for new institutions for global energy gover-
nance, it may be exaggerating its differences with the IEA. In November
2015, the Chinese Energy Administration and the IEA signed a joint state-
ment for their joint program during 2016-2017. During their meeting, they
noted the “(…) progress made in China-IEA co-operation in areas of energy
security, energy policy dialogue, renewables, energy efficiency, energy data
and statistics, energy technology (…)” (42) Later in November 2015, Beijing
hosted a joint workshop on IEA-NEA Policy Dialogue on Oil and Gas De-
velopment.
Chinese energy diplomacy: Building capacity
for global energy governance
In 2007, Chinese analysts put responsibility for Chinese energy insecurity
on lack of state capacity to control the Chinese oil industry domestically
and internationally, and the enduring problem of energy policy incoherence.
China did not have a government agency that could coordinate implemen-
tation of its energy diplomacy. The analysts proposed that China form en-
ergy partnerships that would facilitate greater institutionalisation. (43)
China’s interest in global energy governance is a result of Chinese NOCs’
going-out strategy to secure physical access to oil resources. China uses en-
ergy diplomacy to facilitate Chinese NOCs’ oil acquisitions in regions they
would have difficulty accessing on their own. (44) China has also been placing
more emphasis on energy in its foreign policy agenda, and on energy diplo-
macy, in order to limit China’s exposure to the world oil market, to exert
greater political control over overseas energy activities, and to participate
more effectively in global energy governance. 
The NOCs had persuaded the central government to politically and eco-
nomically underwrite their overseas investments. This led to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs cultivating relations with oil-producing states that gave
China a larger diplomatic presence in the Middle East, Central Asia, and
Africa. (45) China’s high-profile oil diplomacy, its energy “going-out strategy,”
was driven by the perceived need for more secure national control of over-
seas oil and gas supplies rather than directly purchasing oil on the world oil
market.
China’s energy diplomacy (nengyuan waijiao 能源外交) or resource diplo-
macy (ziyuan waijiao 资源外交) has become more important in China’s
search for oil and gas in Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America, areas where
oil companies and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs needed to work
together to establish a Chinese presence. Energy diplomacy was especially
needed in the Middle East, with OPEC, the IEA, and numerous other energy-
related international organisations. Diplomacy was meant to promote
China’s energy interests in regions where Chinese companies cannot gain
access by themselves. (46) In conjunction with enhanced diplomatic activity,
the Chinese government has supplied economic aid and military technology
to oil producing countries.
A key factor for China’s success in securing oil resources overseas is to ex-
clude competitors’ interference in access to those resources. (47) One strat-
egy for doing so would be to bring neighbouring countries’ resources within
a Sino-centric order, for example Myanmar and Kazakhstan. Another Chinese
strategy has been to find its niche within the world oil economy by investing
in those countries considered rogue states, violators of human security,
countries that the oil majors and other national oil corporations have not
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been allowed to invest in because of their pariah status. Another dimension
of energy diplomacy related to rogue states has been China’s use of its veto
in the UN Security Council to protect countries such as Iran from sanctions.
All these practices generate criticism from the West. 
The IEA has critiqued Chinese overseas oil investments, especially the Chi-
nese NOCs’ niche strategy of investing in rogue nations. After Chinese dif-
ficulties with political risks in Sudan, the IEA asked “Are the NOCs finally
paying the price for investing in the most risky countries in the world?” (48)
Chinese contended that the IEA worked in the interests of the OECD
countries, the developed world, “a club of rich countries,” although the IEA
claimed to be representing the entire world in global energy governance. (49)
The IEA’s emphasis on best practices, which was perceived as hostility to
Chinese practices, increased the need for Chinese energy diplomacy to
counter the negative images generated by Chinese NOCs’ association with
rogue states.
In 2002, in preparation for developing China’s capacity for energy diplo-
macy, energy experts studied Russian, American, and Japanese energy diplo-
macy and oil security strategies, trying to ascertain how China could
strengthen its institutional capacity for foreign energy diplomacy. The lesson
Chinese energy analysts took away from the comparative analysis was that
China not only needed to strengthen its own domestic institutional capacity
for energy diplomacy, but also needed to strengthen or create international
energy mechanisms to better cooperate with these major oil producing and
consuming countries. (50) Greater cooperation with these states would
strengthen China’s capacity to withstand oil shocks. (51)
According to a professor from Shanghai Jiaotong University, Zhang Jianxin,
China’s oil diplomacy has numerous functions: maintaining political rela-
tions with oil exporting states, employing diplomatic efforts to maintain
security of the sea lines of communication used to transport oil to China,
fending off a third country’s efforts to disrupt bilateral oil relations, and
“melting down the diplomatic art by enmity states to implement oil trade
embargo against China,” a hypothetical function at present, since there are
no oil embargos against China, although this may be an over-the-horizon
Chinese concern. Oil-based diplomacy was manifested in several ways: Chi-
nese Presidential diplomacy, regional diplomacy in organisations such as
the SCO or APEC, great power diplomacy with the US and Russia, and mul-
tilateral diplomacy with the IEA. (52)
In 2006, emphasis on energy security was added to Hu Jintao’s diplomatic
agenda. James Tang argues that Energy Diplomacy became the third pillar
of Hu’s foreign policy strategy, added to Great Power Diplomacy (daguo
waijiao 大国外交) and Good Neighbour Diplomacy (zhoubian waijiao 周边
外交). (53)
The first volume on the theory and practice of China’s energy diplomacy,
published in 2012, pinpoints interest in energy diplomacy to July 2006,
when Hu Jintao participated in the G8 meeting discussions on energy se-
curity, and then December 2006, the time of the Five Country Energy Min-
isterial Meeting in Beijing. These meetings provided impetus for the Beijing
government to put greater emphasis on energy diplomacy. (54) The 2012 vol-
ume argued that no country could cope with energy security issues on its
own, necessitating international cooperation, which in turn produced a need
for a distinct discipline of energy diplomacy.
After several years of implementing Chinese energy diplomacy, dominated
by Chinese NOCs, a backlash emerged accusing Chinese NOCs of single-
mindedly pursuing commercial oil interests that undermined the govern-
ment’s much wider array of overseas interests. (55) The overseas investments
of NOCs often created political difficulties that diplomats were then called
in to clean up. (56) In 2008, Zhu Feng argued that NOCs such as CNPC had
ignored broader national interests in their pursuit of profits, and had high-
jacked China’s foreign policy in places such as Sudan. China was criticised
for oil investments in Sudan during the time of human rights atrocities in
the Darfur region. Zhang Yunling, Director of the Academic Division of In-
ternational Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, dispatched a team
of researchers to Darfur to conduct a social impact assessment on the pres-
ence of Chinese NOCs in Sudan. (57)
Some authors argue that NOCs operate under their own volition accord-
ing to commercial interests and not at the direction of the Chinese govern-
ment or in collaboration with the government. Other analysts argue that
overseas energy investments are shaped by the Chinese government’s
strategic priorities. (58) The Chinese emphasis on energy diplomacy reveals
that various government ministries were in fact involved with, and had re-
sponsibilities for, furthering Chinese NOCs’ oil and gas acquisitions overseas.
The Ministry of Commerce supported an aggressive search for energy deals
while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs preferred a more incremental approach
that did not raise alarmist reactions that the Ministry’s diplomats would
have to manage. (59)
In March 2012, CCTV raised the question of whether China’s diplomacy
was overly dominated by energy diplomacy to the point of excluding other
foreign policy interests and undermining other foreign policy objectives. (60)
NOCs were accused of only seeking profits, not contributing to China’s en-
ergy security, losing money on their oil investments, and shipping only a
portion of this oil back to China, a negligible amount compared to China’s
oil imports. (61) And they were undermining the Chinese government’s efforts
at creating greater soft power for China.
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The white paper on China Energy Policy 2012 reflected China’s progress
in international energy cooperation, although it repeated much of the con-
tent of the 2007 China Energy white paper. What was new in the China En-
ergy Policy 2012 white paper was the mention of an “international energy
management mechanism” as a means to maintain a stable global energy
market, an indication of China’s interest in global energy governance. (62) In
listing the organisations with Chinese participation, compared to the 2007
white paper, ASEAN+3 was omitted while the Group of 20 and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation were added.
Zha Daojiong has noted that the world oil economy has many questions
about Chinese NOCs’ overseas oil investments, which the Chinese govern-
ment has tried to mitigate with White Papers on Chinese Energy Policy. (63)
These white papers are produced for international consumption but are in-
sufficient as perceptions of the Black Energy Swan persist, fuelled by China’s
expanding oil demand.
Energy reformers believe that China’s domestic energy economy can evolve
into a low-carbon economy through participation in global and regional energy
governance. The International Energy Strategic Research Centre of Renmin Uni-
versity was established during China’s 2003 energy crisis. The Centre has worked
on China’s energy diplomacy and other issues related to global energy gover-
nance. The Centre has published a series of reports since 2009. The most recent
is International Energy Cooperation Report of China in 2011/2012. The organi-
sations the report focuses on are both Western and non-Western: the IEA, OPEC,
the Energy Charter, the International Energy Forum (IEF), the World Energy Coun-
cil (WEC), the G20, the SCO, and the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). (64)
BRICS energy governance
Given both Chinese and Russian declarations on constructing a new world
order, the newly formed BRICS provided the best opportunity to create a
new kind of global energy governance. BRICS energy governance has several
dimensions: BRICS energy demand and energy efficiency, BRICS NOCs,
BRICS rules for a producer-consumer dialogue, and BRICS policies on the
world energy market, either market-sustaining or market-blocking. This sec-
tion is concerned with whether BRICS have the potential to construct an
alternative world order in global energy governance.
The concept of BRIC was constructed by a Goldman Sachs executive in
2001 looking for a label for emerging economies, although he did not realise
the impact these countries would have on global energy supply and de-
mand. (65) The IEA ranks Brazil fourth in energy consumption among its Non-
IEA Member Countries after China, India, and Russia. (66) Brazil became
energy sufficient in 2006 and a net exporter of oil in 2011. South Africa is
also a Non-IEA Member Country. (67) India’s energy security is the least stable
of all the BRICS. (68)
All BRICS nations have national oil companies (NOCs), whether they are
net-importers or net-exporters. The NOCs work very closely with their gov-
ernments, making energy an important priority of the country’s foreign pol-
icy. (69) BRICS banks work closely with their NOCs, at the direction of the
government, providing funding for oil investments. In China, the State De-
velopment Bank, Import and Export Bank, and other banks fund Chinese
NOCs.
What BRICS have in common is that they are emerging economies rapidly
consuming the world’s hydrocarbons in unsustainable ways that contribute
to global climate change. BRICS have energy intensive development, lacking
the resources or the will to invest in energy efficiency. BRICS represent 40%
of the world’s population, with large portions of their populations relying
on coal and other large portions of their populations still waiting for access
to modern energy. The OECD worries that the largest of the BRICS, China
and India, will “account for 95% of energy demand growth to 2035.” (70)
In 2008, the OECD predicted that the BRIC group by 2030 would consume
more primary energy than the 30 OECD countries combined. The OECD’s
concern was the environmental impact from this rapidly expanding global-
isation of energy demand. (71) BRICS fiercely defend their right to develop-
ment irrespective of the environmental consequences.
Among the BRICS countries, China in particular took offense at the IEA’s
concern with its exploding oil demand. As a group, BRICS generate world
concern due to their contributions to greenhouse gases and climate change,
although the BRICS do not form a cohesive bloc within international climate
change meetings. (72)
Russia’s inclusion was a little odd because it is not an emerging economy,
but Moscow embraced the concept as it was looking for a vehicle to con-
struct an alternative world energy order. Russia’s focus was on creating a
security-focused institution when it initiated the first BRIC Summit in 2009.
South Africa joined in 2010, making it the “BRICS.” Russian leadership of
this bloc could happen only if the BRICS developed as an energy institution. 
The BRICS’s stated purpose differs significantly from the Russian objective.
The BRICS state that they want “peace, security, development and coopera-
tion”; to find ways of “building a harmonious world of lasting peace and com-
mon prosperity” through “democratic and transparent decision-making.” (73)
A review of BRICS history indicates that global energy governance con-
cepts have emerged in BRICS summits, which have met annually since 2009.
The Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders at Yekaterinburg on 16
June 2009 emphasised the role of the G20 in responding to the global fi-
nancial crisis of 2008, which should reconfigure the economic and financial
global system in the aftermath of the crisis. An entire paragraph in the Yeka-
terinburg statement was devoted to energy:
We stand for strengthening coordination and cooperation among
states in the energy field, including amongst energy producers and
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consumers and transit states, in an effort to decrease uncertainty
and ensure stability and sustainability. We support diversification of
energy resources and supply, including renewable energy, security of
energy transit routes and creation of new energy investments and
infrastructure. (74)
The 2009 BRIC summit supported the concept of producer-consumer-
transit state dialogue, supported diversification of types of energy and
sources of supply, and supported cooperation in energy infrastructure. The
BRICs supported sustainability and stability. On these principles, BRIC policy
on energy did not diverge from international energy institutions and did
not seem like an alternative world energy order.
The 2010 Brasilia Summit Statement stressed access to modern energy
as necessary to economic growth, access to affordable, clean, and sustain-
able energy, and supported BRIC cooperation in energy efficiency, R&D,
training and technology transfer. (75)
The 2011 Sanya Summit created an Action Plan and began to thicken net-
works and linkages among the members. The Sanya Declaration opposed
excessive volatility in world commodity prices, especially energy, and em-
phasised the need to strengthen producer-consumer dialogue for the pur-
pose of achieving a better balance of supply and demand. The Declaration
also supported cooperation on renewable energy and nuclear energy. (76)
The 2012 Delhi Summit produced a Delhi Declaration and a Delhi Action
Plan. The Declaration stressed strengthening producer-consumer dialogues,
especially in food and energy, to counter excessive volatility in commodities
markets. It recognised Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy that was con-
sistent with IEAE oversight. The Delhi Action Plan included exploring the
possibility of a BRICS framework for multilateral energy cooperation, cre-
ating the possibility of an alternative world energy order.
The 2013 Durban Summit in South Africa was expected to create a BRICS
development bank, a business council, and a network of think tanks. Funding
for a $100 billion stabilisation fund depended on China, which would con-
tribute $41 billion, while South Africa would contribute $5 billion, with $18
billion each from the other BRICS countries. (77) Energy and food security
had been stated priorities prior to the summit. The National Union of Met-
alworkers of South Africa made formation of a BRICS energy mechanism a
test of whether BRICS as an organisation was viable, stating, “The question
of energy, its production, supply and consumption will be a litmus test of
whether the constellation known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa) is a coherent political entity.” (78) The Union claimed that for
BRICS to continue their rapid economic growth, they would need sufficient
and reliable supplies of energy. 
China treated the 2013 Summit as an opportunity to develop strategic
partnerships between China and Africa, and further develop oil relations.
President Xi Jinping held a side meeting with African leaders during the sum-
mit to explore further areas of cooperation. (79)
Russia continued to encourage institutionalisation of the BRICS frame-
work. It was Russia that followed-up on the Delhi Action Plan, issuing a con-
cept paper from the Kremlin on Russia in the BRICS on the eve of the 2013
Durban Summit. One entire section was devoted to Russian objectives in
BRICS energy cooperation: energy security for Russia and other BRICS, long-
term supply contracts, a legal framework for energy cooperation (rules and
institutions), joint research and technology exchanges for energy efficiency
and renewable energies. According to this Kremlin concept paper, Russia
would take the lead in BRICS energy governance:
In order to fulfill these objectives the Russian Federation will actively
participate in the creation of mechanisms for the multilateral coop-
eration of BRICS states in the sphere of energy, such as the Energy
Dialogue. (80)
The concept paper reiterates much of what was in the 2009 Yekaterinburg
statement. This potential BRICS mechanism would create an alternative
global energy governance structure focused on a producer-consumer dia-
logue. 
The BRICS 2013 Summit failed to address the Russian proposal and failed
to create an energy multilateral mechanism. The 5th BRICS Summit issued
the BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Indus-
trialization: eThekwini Declaration and Action Plan, in which there was no
mention of energy except at the end as a new area of cooperation to be
explored at future meetings. (81)
Numerous differences exist according to Chinese scholars: “Russia empha-
sizes reforming the current international finance system; South Africa calls
for protection of African interests; India and Brazil try to make the BRICS
mechanism as the stepping stone to becoming permanent members of UN
Security Council.” (82) Russia and China oppose the UN Security Council ex-
panding its membership. In addition, Beijing promoted the China Model,
which did not represent the BRICS model.
China argues that the purpose of BRICS is: to reform global governance,
give a larger voice to emerging economies, and to “democratise interna-
tional relations,” which means providing a counterweight to US power. Bei-
jing expects the BRICS to function as a bloc supporting Chinese initiatives
in the world economy and polity. Russia hopes that BRICS will form into a
bloc and provide a sphere of influence for Moscow that would give it an
equal footing with the US. 
By the 2013 BRICS Summit, Russia was still hoping that the BRICS would
take on a geopolitical role, would develop a unified position on a range of
issues, and would recognise Russian leadership. The Summit’s minimal men-
tion of energy indicates that other BRICS countries were not ready for Russ-
ian leadership or an energy mechanism.
Russian newspapers expressed disappointment with the lack of concrete
outcomes, calling the BRICS a dialogue rather than a mechanism that would
form only part of the global governance system. (83) In his address to the
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Summit, Putin had called for co-financing in green economy projects, (84)
but since the summit could not move forward on the BRICS development
bank, it was premature to consider financing green energy projects. There
was nothing in the Summit Declaration about green economy projects, al-
though it did acknowledge that climate change was a challenge to sustain-
able development.
At the July 2014 BRICS Summit in Brazil, the BRICS signed an agreement
to create the $100 billion BRICS Development Bank with a reserve currency
pool worth over another $100 billion. It would later be called the New De-
velopment Bank (NDB) with headquarters in Shanghai. NDB has shared
leadership, with each member country having a vote, no country having
veto power, and leadership positions distributed among the BRICS. NDB was
to begin lending in 2016.
In July 2015, Moscow hosted the 7th BRICS summit, combining it with the
15th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit and an informal meeting
of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). It was a diplomatic manoeuver that
managed to subsume the BRICS and the SCO into the EEU, realising Putin’s
vision of Eurasian integration under an organisation where Russia has a clear
leadership role. Moscow demonstrated that it was not isolated by Western
sanctions. 
Moscow introduced some energy initiatives. Russia and South Africa
signed an energy MoU for a Russian-built nuclear power plant in South
Africa. Moscow initiated a meeting of the BRICS Heads of Industrial and
Energy Safety Authorities. The 7th BRICS Summit Ufa Declaration had a sec-
tion on energy, Item No. 69 at the bottom, which called for BRICS energy
cooperation, noted the first BRICS meeting on energy efficiency in May
2015, and acknowledged the Russian proposal to hold a meeting of the
BRICS’ Ministers of Energy at an unspecified time. Overall, it was not suc-
cessful in creating a BRICS energy organisation.
The NDB was officially launched after many weeks of wrangling over its
rules and policies. NDB will have an initial capitalisation of $100 billion. The
NDB was a necessary component in constructing a role for BRICS in global
energy governance. Yet it did not clearly demonstrate China’s leadership
role in global energy governance because of the shared leadership model
and because Russia intended to assert its leadership role in a BRICS energy
mechanism. Beijing remained frustrated with the slow pace and con-
tentiousness in forming the NDB, moving on to the Asian Infrastructure In-
vestment Bank (AIIB), where Beijing had a clear leadership role.
The possibility that BRICS will shape a new global architecture in energy, or
that they will impact the world political and economic order with a new theory
of international energy institutions, seems remote. Given that all the BRICS
are in the global ungoverned energy space, and that they are a very disparate
group of states, makes theorising about alternative global energy governance
an impossible task. At this juncture, it is only a possibility. BRICS is an acronym
that still needs to prove its substance for global energy governance.
Conclusion
China continues to seek participation in the current global energy gov-
ernance system, contributing to its reform even though this would lead
to continual pressure for Chinese domestic energy policy reform. At the
same time, China seeks to create an alternative global energy order
using the framework of the BRICS and the SCO.
For Beijing, the BRICS organisation is a means for influencing the existing
global energy governance order as part of a coalition. According to Zhu
Jiejin, Centre for BRICS Studies in Fudan University, “(…) China is neither
with nor against western powers (...). China accepts the existing framework
while trying to make changes to it. It will be better for China to seek these
changes together with India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa than going it
alone.” (85)
The liberal institutionalist approach needs modification based on its ap-
plication to the BRICS. China’s efforts to create an alternative global energy
order by creating international institutions, the BRICS and later the Silk Road
Economic Belt, has not followed the path of the IEA. The IEA has tried to
impose best practices and transparency on the world oil economy’s “dark
underbelly” of corruption in oil producing states. China’s institution building
has not made any reformist demands on corrupt BRICS oil exporters/im-
porters, nor has it done so with corrupt Central Asian countries along the
New Silk Road Economic Belt. The liberal institutionalist approach should
be modified to be less value-laden, which would make the approach more
applicable to illiberal states. We should not assume that international in-
stitutions are constructed to promote best practices, transparency, and cor-
ruption avoidance.
International relations theory has yet to adjust to a non-Western world
order. Chinese international relations theory, in all its variations, has a Chi-
nese audience but has not been adopted by the BRICS. The BRICS may never
devise an international relations theory for themselves as they are an im-
probable collection of states who trade more with the West than with each
other. BRICS membership includes two net exporting countries and three
net importing countries. Whatever theory of international energy institu-
tions BRICS would devise must reflect the interests of both exporting and
importing nations.
Wang Jisi’s work on Chinese perceptions of the evolving global order ar-
gues that China has shifted from promoting a new international order to
calling for a more “just and equitable” global order. China is advocating re-
form of the current global order rather than its displacement, and expects
to achieve greater representation in international institutions such as the
World Bank, IMF, and WTO. Global governance participation will not change
the essential authoritarian nature of the Chinese state. (86)
Chinese membership in the BRICS and SCO organisations facilitates Chi-
nese NOC oil and gas investments in member countries. This may be the
primary function of these organisations rather than formation of an alter-
native global energy governance order. 
BRICS as an organisation appears not yet ready to fill the global energy
governance deficit. Chinese analysts such as Xu Xiaojie promote a BRICS
energy cooperation mechanism that could lead to cooperation at the global
level, placing the BRICS “(…) at the forefront of multilateral innovation and
institution building in a critical area of global governance.” (87) The mecha-
nism’s purpose would be to “(…) challenge current global governance sys-
tems dominated by Western economies, and lead to the formation of a new
global governance system.” (88) Xu hopes BRICS could “(…) coordinate their
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positions so that they can speak with a common voice in forums such as
the International Energy Forum (IEF).” (89)
However, the BRICS cannot be the vehicle for Chinese leadership of global
governance. The BRICS practice shared leadership, and Russia continues to
hold expectations that the BRICS will be an arena for Russian leadership. The
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation had a similar problem of Beijing con-
tending with Moscow for leadership of the regime.
The vehicle for uncontested Chinese leadership was announced in 2013
as the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” an effort to create a new economic order
with Central Asia and the Middle East. The primary focus of SREB is for China
to build transport infrastructure in Central Asia and export surplus Chinese
capacity in cement, aluminium, and steel in building the infrastructure. As
proposed by Xi Jinping in September 2013, SREB will “consist of a network
of railways, highways and other forms of infrastructure, as well as oil and
gas pipelines, power grids, internet networks and aviation routes in the
Eurasian area.” (90)
Chinese NOCs have been investing in Central Asian oil and gas since the 1990s.
SREB, however, is meant to create a land bridge that encompasses Central Asian
and Middle Eastern oil exporting countries within a geopolitical framework that
will bind these energy producing regions closer to China. China perceives pipelines
as more secure than energy brought via maritime routes. It is the “Eurasian Land
Bridge” concept discussed by Chinese analysts in the 1990s.
Existing energy infrastructure includes the Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline, from
Turkmenistan to China, passing through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and
the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline. The fourth pipeline, to be completed in
2020, has been designated a SREB project although the previous three
pipelines predate the Silk Road project. (91)
Further explanation of the Silk Road energy order was offered at a con-
ference on “Strengthening Energy Cooperation in the One Belt One Road
Regions,” 15-16 June 2015, organised by the Global Forum on Energy Se-
curity (GFES). The Forum is China’s international platform for consulting on
transformations in global energy governance and China’s role in it. The GFES
2015 was co-organised by Chinese institutions, the United States Energy
Security Council, and the Chinese Energy Fund Committee, an NGO that
appears to be a mechanism for US-China energy dialogue.
The CCP’s 18th Party Congress initiated Xi Jinping’s foreign policy of greater
Chinese assertiveness and schemes to restructure the regional and global
order. (92) Chinese NOCs were instructed to define their contribution to re-
gional projects such as the New Silk Road project. (93) The Chinese Foreign
Ministry was tasked with energy diplomacy along the Silk Road. (94)
In World Energy China Outlook 2014-2015, Xu Xiaojie urged Chinese en-
ergy companies to shift their strategy of “Going out” toward the “Silk Road”
strategic concept. (95) This was only three years after Xu called for empha-
sising BRICS.
It would seem that China is participating in global energy governance
while constructing an alternative Silk Road energy order. It is unlikely that
the Silk Road energy order with Central Asia and the Middle East will be-
come an autonomous energy system, but rather will be incorporated into
the larger global energy governance system.
Chinese economic growth has slowed, resulting in reduced demand for
oil imports. Nevertheless, in April 2015 China became the world’s largest
oil importer, and its domestic energy ungoverned spaces became a problem
for world oil markets.
China’s domestic capacity for participating in global energy governance
is nevertheless still very weak. China’s hope is that global participation will
strengthen and modernise China’s energy management capacity both do-
mestically and internationally.
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